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ABSTRACT
We model stock price manipulation when the manipulator is in the role of an 
intermediary (broker). We find that in the absence of superior information, the broker can 
manipulate equilibrium outcomes without losing credibility with respect to accurate 
forecasting. This result extends to the case when the broker prefers more investment to 
come into the market. However, when competition among brokers is introduced then the 
investors get their favorite outcome in the absence of superior information. 
This result has important implications for encouraging broker competitions in developing 
markets. Many developing markets are still not demutualized; hence broker level 
competition is limited in such markets.
JEL Classification Codes: C72, D80, G10, G20
Keywords: Stock Price Manipulation, Broker Manipulation, Broker Competition, 
      Broker Bias, Emerging Markets, Market Microstructure
1 I am grateful to Hanjoon Michael Jung for helpful comments. All omissions and remaining errors are the 
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Stock Price Manipulation: The Role of Intermediaries
In emerging stock markets, the issue of stock price manipulation by intermediaries often 
arises. Numerous accounts of emerging stock markets today share this concern. Khwaja 
and Mian (2005) use a unique trade level dataset to show that when market intermediaries 
(brokers) in a Pakistani stock exchange trade on their own behalf, they earn at least 50 to 
90 percentage points higher annual returns and these abnormal returns are earned at the 
expense of outside investors. Zhou and Mei (2003) note that the China’s worst stock 
market crime was the result of a scheme implemented in collusion with brokers. They 
argue that manipulation by brokers is common in many emerging stock markets. Khanna 
and Sunder (1999), in a case study of the Indian stock market, states that “brokers were 
often accused of collaborating with the company owners to rig share prices in pump and 
dump schemes”. Furthermore, according to a survey conducted by the Times of India in 
October 2005, a majority of market participants in India believe that brokers manipulate 
prices. In fact, in 2005, the Securities and Exchange Board of India barred 11 brokers for 
engaging in price manipulation. 
A number of studies have examined the issue of stock price manipulation by 
speculators who are not in the role of intermediaries. Allen and Gale (1992) show that it 
is possible for an uninformed trader to manipulate prices if the investors attach a positive 
probability to the manipulator being an informed player. Jarrow (1992) and Hart (1977) 
have analyzed manipulation in a dynamic asset pricing context and show that under 
certain conditions speculators can make profits. However, a theoretical framework for 
understanding manipulation when the manipulator is in the role of an intermediary is 
lacking, even though anecdotes abound. Consequently, a number of key questions remain 
unanswered. Firstly, anecdotal manipulation schemes involving brokers such as the pump 
and dump2 schemes require a continuous supply of irrational investors who, like sheep, 
follow each other only to be slaughtered. Assuming a relentless supply of irrational 
investors who keep on placing themselves at the mercy of manipulating brokers specially 
when the stakes are very high seems unreasonable. Secondly, reputation is a key asset in 
2 See Khwaja and Mian (2005)
2
a market where brokers compete for business. How can manipulating brokers, if they 
indeed manipulate, maintain their credibility (reputation) and clientele in the face of 
competition from other brokers? Thirdly, mature markets do not seem to suffer from the 
manipulation schemes typically associated with emerging markets.3 What allows mature 
markets to function seemingly free of this type of manipulation?
In this paper, we present a market microstructure model, which uses a 3-player 
coordination game framework developed in Jung (2007). Jung (2007) models an arms 
race scenario in which media has power to influence outcomes. However, the idea 
underlying Jung’s model is general; if there is a coordination game between two parties 
with asymmetric information then a third part with powers to reduce asymmetry can 
manipulate equilibrium outcomes. Here, we apply this idea to financial markets and study 
a coordination game between institutional and individual investors with broker as an 
intermediary with powers to reduce asymmetry through its signaling. The key is to realize 
that if brokers care about their credibility and investors know that, then in an apparent 
defiance of intuition, brokers get to manipulate without losing credibility.
This paper should be thought of as an initial attempt at understanding the 
systematic price manipulation by brokers through microstructure approach. Specifically, 
it provides several simple models in which an intermediary can successfully manipulate 
demand in equilibrium without losing credibility. The models presented here are general 
and are not limited to emerging markets; hence they provide conditions under which 
manipulation is checked. Those conditions are more likely to be met in developed 
markets.
In the basic model, there are three players, an individual investor, an institutional 
investor, and a stock broker. There is a positive probability that the institutional investor 
has superior information. If it does, then it trades accordingly. However, if it does not, 
then it prefers to coordinate its demand level choices with the individual investor. The 
individual investor never has superior information so he always prefers to coordinate his 
demand level choices with the institutional investor. That is, in the absence of superior 
information, each investor prefers to do as the other investor does.  This notion of feeling 
3 Aggarwal and Wu (2006) present evidence of stock market manipulations in the United States. Their data 
suggests that manipulators are plausibly brokers.
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safe while doing as other do when information is insufficient is commonly known as the 
‘herd instinct’ among traders. Such a tendency is known in microeconomic literature as 
the bandwagon effect. The bandwagon effect arises when people’s preference for a 
commodity increases as the demand by others for the commodity increases. 
Leibenstein(1950) is one of the earlier studies of the bandwagon effect and the main 
impetus for the induction of this effect in microeconomics. The bandwagon effect is not 
only just intuitively and theoretically appealing, but there also exists significant empirical 
evidence for it.  As on example, Biddle (1991) empirically estimates this effect in the 
demand and distinguishes it from other effects. Arguably, the bandwagon effect in the 
stock market is stronger when there is insufficient information.
In our model, the individual investor does not observe the type of the institutional 
investor, however, the broker does. The broker, whose primary preference is to preserve 
his credibility (which will be lost if either investor determines that the broker has lied), 
sends a signal in the form of a publicly available research report. The research report 
forecasts a bullish, bearish, or a neutral market. The report is read by each investor as 
providing a signal about the other investor. A bullish signal is read by the individual 
investor as implying that the institutional investor will invest with optimism, a bearish 
signal as implying no investment by the institutional investor, and a neutral signal 
indicating that the institutional investor will invest with caution. The institutional investor 
also reads the report in the same fashion as providing a signal about the individual 
investor. 
The conditional preference of the broker is to manipulate demand. After the signal 
has been received and has become public knowledge, both types of investors choose their 
demand levels simultaneously. The main result is that if the institutional investor does not 
have superior information, then the broker can manipulate demand in equilibrium while 
maintaining credibility. 
The model is then enriched to allow for competition between brokers and to allow 
for a specific broker bias. Conditions are specified under which manipulation is 
mitigated. Compared to mature markets, those conditions are much less likely to hold in 
emerging markets. Hence, as predicted by the model, broker manipulation anecdotes 
abound in emerging markets and not much so in mature markets. 
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The Basic Model
The basic model uses a 3-player coordination framework developed in Jung (2007). 
Jung(2007) models an arms race scenario in which media has power to influence 
outcomes. However, the idea underlying Jung’s model is general; if there is a 
coordination game between two parties with asymmetric information then a third part 
with powers to reduce asymmetry can manipulate equilibrium outcomes. Here, we apply 
this idea to financial markets and study a coordination game between institutional and 
individual investors with broker as an intermediary with powers to reduce asymmetry 
through its signaling.
There are three players; the individual investor (S), the institutional investor (L), 
and the stock broker (B). Each investor can choose from any of the following demand 
levels: investing with optimism (I), investing with caution (C), and not investing (N). 
I>C>N=0.4  S and L have their own types. L can be optimistic, neutral, or pessimistic. S 
is always neutral. The optimistic type has superior information that the market will go up 
so it prefers to choose I. The pessimistic type has superior information that the market 
will go down so it prefers to choose N, and the neutral type does not have superior 
information either way and is prone to the bandwagon effect. Specifically, his primary 
preference is to match his demand level choice with the other player and the conditional 
preference is to invest cautiously or choose C. 
The following inequalities describe the preference of optimistic and pessimistic types of 
L:
},max{ (.)(.)(.) )()()( NCI optimistLoptimistLoptimistL uuu > (1)
},max{ (.)(.)(.) )()()( CIN pessimistLpessimistLpessimistL uuu > (2)
These inequalities show that the optimistic type of L prefers to choose the demand level I 
irrespective of what S does and the pessimistic type of L prefers to choose the demand 
level N irrespective of what S does. The fact the L is optimistic or pessimistic implies 
4 As all three demand level choices are non-negative, short selling is not allowed.
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possession of superior information. Consequently, L acts in accordance with superior 
information and is not prone to the ‘herd instinct’. That is, L does not care what S does as 
long as it has superior information to rely on.
The following inequality describes the primary preference of neutral type of L:
},,,,,max{
},,min{
)()()()()()(
)()()(
ICINNCNICICN
IINNCC
neutralLneutralLneutralLneutralLneutralLneutralL
neutralLneutralLneutralL
uuuuuu
uuu >
(3)
This inequality captures the ‘herd instinct’ or the bandwagon effect and shows that a 
neutral type of L prefers outcomes in which it successfully matches the demand level 
choices of S over outcomes in which the choices are not matched. A neutral type of L 
does not have superior information about the market going either way. Such an investor 
feels safe when he does the same as others are doing, a phenomenon known as the ‘herd 
instinct’ among market participants.
The conditional preference of neutral type of L:
},max{ )()()( NNIICC neutralLneutralLneutralL uuu > (4)
This inequality shows that conditional on successfully coordinating its demand level 
choices with S, the neutral type of L prefers to invest cautiously. That is, when one does 
not have superior information, one prefers to do as others are doing and conditional on 
that, one prefers to invest cautiously.
The following inequalities describe the primary and conditional preference of S 
respectively (S is always of type neutral):
},,,,,max{},,min{ ICINNCNICICNNNIICC SSSSSSSSS uuuuuuuuu > (5)
},max{ NNIICC SSS uuu > (6)
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S never has superior information telling him what to do. So, he prefers to do as L is doing 
since L may have superior information. Furthermore, conditional on successfully 
mimicking L’s choice, he prefers to invest cautiously.
The probability of L being optimistic is )1,0(∈o , of being pessimistic is )1,0(∈p , 
and the probability of being neutral is po −−1 . In this model, uncertainty is only about 
the type of institutional investor. 
This game proceeds as follows. At stage zero, Nature chooses L’s type. Only L 
and B detect L’s type. At stage one, B publishes a research report, which forecasts the 
direction of the market; bullish, bearish, or neutral.  Each investor takes this report as a 
signal about the other investor’s intention. Bullish means that the other investor will be 
choosing the demand level I, bearish means that the other investor will be choosing the 
demand level N, and neutral implies the demand level choice of C by the other investor.
At stage 2, both S and L simultaneously choose I, C, or N. After all the actions are taken, 
payoffs are realized.
Regarding broker preferences, the broker has a primary preference for 
maintaining his credibility in the eyes of investors and a conditional preference for 
manipulating demand. The broker will lose credibility if he fails to correctly forecast the 
actions of investors. 
The following inequality describes the broker’s primary preference of credibility:
},,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
,,,,,,max{},,min{ .
NNCNCCNICNIINCINNICINCCNCNNCCICNICIIINCICCIICINN
NCNNINCNCCICINIICIICNIINNNNCCCIII
uuuuuuuuuuuuuuuu
uuuuuuuuuuu >
(7)
Here, ICIu is the payoff to B if B signals I, S plays C, and L plays I. Other entries in the 
above inequality are similarly read.  So, if the broker forecasts a bullish market, it would 
not lose credibility if both investors choose I (that would push prices up resulting in a 
bullish market). Similarly, if a bearish outlook is forecasted, then the credibility is 
preserved if both investors choose N (that would push prices down resulting in a bearish 
market). And if the prediction is neutral, then credibility is maintained if both investors 
choose C. 
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It is important to note that instead of expressing results in terms of demand level 
choices, we could as easily work with prices. All one has to do is note that since number 
of shares outstanding is exogenously fixed therefore fluctuations in prices are only caused 
by fluctuations in aggregate demand. We refrain from doing that since it would only add 
a layer of complexity without changing the results.
 Figure 1 shows the game in extensive form.
Figure 1: The coordination game in extensive form. Only the middle branch is 
labeled.
In the absence of B, it is easy to see that there is one pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium if L’s type is optimistic in which both S and L play I. Similarly, if L’s type is 
pessimistic; both S and L play N in equilibrium.  If L is neutral then the game in the 
absence of B has three pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian equilibria. They are both play I, 
both play C, and both play N. CC (both play C) outcome is preferred by both players. 
How does introducing B in this game change the outcomes? Theorem 1 provides an 
answer.
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Theorem 1 Pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian equilibria exist and, in the absence of  
superior information, the broker can manipulate equilibrium outcomes without losing 
credibility with respect to accurate forecasting.
Proof. Here every pure strategy of each player is examined. L observes both the nature’s 
move (its own type) as well as B’s signal. Each type of L has 27 strategies; however, for 
the optimistic type 26 strategies are dominated by the strategy I since an optimistic type 
always prefers to play I (inequality 1). Similarly, for the pessimistic type 26 strategies are 
dominated by the strategy N since a pessimistic type always prefers to play N 
(inequality2). That leaves us with 27 undominated strategies for the neutral type of L and 
1 undominated strategy each for other types of L.
B observes nature’s move. B has 27 pure strategies. 24 of them are eliminated by 
iterated dominance since B cares about correctly forecasting the actions of L (inequality 
7) and optimistic type of L always plays I and the pessimistic type of L always plays N. 
We are left with 3 pure strategies for B.
Next, if B signals C, and both S and L play either I or N then B would have an 
incentive to deviate (inequality 7) implying that a strategy combination in which B 
signals C, and both S and L play either I or N in response cannot be an equilibrium. 
By inspection, we arrive at the following pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian equilibria:
]:)(;:)(};|,|,|{:)(
};|,|,|{:};|,|,|{:[
NpessimistLIoptimistLNNCCIIneutralL
NNCCIISpessimistNneutralCoptimistIB
(I)
]:)(;:)(};|,|,|{:)(
};|,|,|{:};|,|,|{:[
NpessimistLIoptimistLNNCCIIneutralL
NNCCIISpessimistNneutralIoptimistIB
(II)
]:)(;:)(};|,|,|{:)(
};|,|,|{:};|,|,|{:[
NpessimistLIoptimistLNNCCIIneutralL
NNCCIISpessimistNneutralNoptimistIB
(III)
]:)(;:)(};|,|,|{:)(
};|,|,|{:};|,|,|{:[
NpessimistLIoptimistLNNCIIIneutralL
NNCIIISpessimistNneutralIoptimistIB
(IV)
]:)(;:)(};|,|,|{:)(
};|,|,|{:};|,|,|{:[
NpessimistLIoptimistLNNCNIIneutralL
NNCNIISpessimistNneutralIoptimistIB
(V)
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]:)(;:)(};|,|,|{:)(
};|,|,|{:};|,|,|{:[
NpessimistLIoptimistLNNCIIIneutralL
NNCIIISpessimistNneutralNoptimistIB
(VI)
]:)(;:)(};|,|,|{:)(
};|,|,|{:};|,|,|{:[
NpessimistLIoptimistLNNCNIIneutralL
NNCNIISpessimistNneutralNoptimistIB
(VII)
Note that in all equilibria, when B signals I, both S and L play I and when B signals N, 
both S and L play N. In equilibrium (I), B correctly signals the type of L, and S acts in 
accordance with the signal. That is, if B signals I, S plays I, if B signals N, S plays N and 
if B signals C, S plays C. In the remaining equilibria, B incorrectly signals the type only 
when L is neutral. In that case, if B signals I then in the outcome both S and L play I. 
However, if B signals N then in the outcome both S and L play N. Hence, in the absence 
of superior information (when L is of neutral type) B can manipulate the equilibrium 
outcomes without losing credibility with respect to accurate forecasting.
▄
It is easy to see how a manipulation scheme can work. Suppose L’s type is neutral, that 
is, the institutional investor does not have superior information. Suppose that B wants the 
stock price to rise (B may have taken a long position on its own account), it will signal I 
(bullish report) and in the outcome both S and L will play I. In contrast, if B wants the 
stock price to fall (due to a short position), it will signal N (bearish report) and in the 
outcome both S and L will play N. This is consistent with Khwaja and Mian (2005), a 
study that uses a unique trade level dataset to show that when market intermediaries 
(brokers) in a Pakistani stock exchange trade on their own behalf, they earn at least 50 to 
90 percentage points higher annual returns and these abnormal returns are earned at the 
expense of outside investors.
Brokers make money when people invest in the market. Arguably, brokers have a 
bias. They want more investment to come into the market. Next, we introduce this bias in 
the model. Specifically, conditional on successfully meeting its preference, the broker 
prefers an outcome in which more investment comes into the market. Consequently, 
another restriction is added to B’s preference in addition to inequality 7:
10
NNNCCCIII uuu >> (8)
How does this bias change equilibrium? Corollary 1 to theorem 1 provides an answer.
Corollary 1 Pure-Strategy Perfect Bayesian equilibria exist in which, in the absence of  
superior information, the broker can manipulate demand to get its favorite outcome 
without losing credibility with respect to accurate forecasting.
Proof.  By a similar argument as given in the proof of theorem 1, we arrive at the 
following pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian equilibria:
]:)(;:)(};|,|,|{:)(
};|,|,|{:};|,|,|{:[
NpessimistLIoptimistLNNCCIIneutralL
NNCCIISpessimistNneutralIoptimistIB
 (I)
]:)(;:)(};|,|,|{:)(
};|,|,|{:};|,|,|{:[
NpessimistLIoptimistLNNCIIIneutralL
NNCIIISpessimistNneutralIoptimistIB
  (II)
]:)(;:)(};|,|,|{:)(
};|,|,|{:};|,|,|{:[
NpessimistLIoptimistLNNCIIIneutralL
NNCNIISpessimistNneutralIoptimistIB
(III)
In these equilibria, if L’s type is neutral, B always signals I and both S and L always play 
I in response. Hence, the broker gets its favorite outcome in the absence of superior 
information. The conditional preference of investors is not met.
▄
Broker Competition
The basic model shows that the broker can manipulate equilibrium outcomes. What will 
happen if competition among brokers is introduced into the model? Will competition 
mitigate broker manipulation? In this section, we show that it does. Mature and emerging 
stock markets differ significantly along the dimension of brokerage competition. Hence, 
one reason for smaller anecdotal evidence of broker manipulation in mature markets may 
be the higher level of competition among brokers. As one example, in the Karachi Stock 
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Exchange (KSE), the premier exchange in Pakistan, two largest brokers practically 
dominate the market and have been the largest suppliers of a special mode of financing 
called badla financing. Anecdotes of manipulation in KSE have these two brokers acting 
in unison, practically nullifying any competition. See Khwaja and Mian (2005).
We allow broker competition in the model in the form of a second broker. In the 
modified model, there are 4 players; two brokers, an individual investor (S), and an 
institutional investor (L). At stage zero, nature chooses L’s type. Only L and the two 
brokers, B1 and B2, detect L’s type. At stage one, B1 publishes a research reports which 
forecasts the direction of the market and is either bullish (I), bearish (N), or neutral (C). 
As before, this report is read by each investor as the signal about the intended demand 
level choice of the other investor. At stage two, B2 also publishes a report which is 
similarly read by each investor.  At stage 3, both S and L simultaneously choose I, C, or 
N. After all the actions are taken, payoffs are realized.
Regarding brokers’ preferences, just like in the basic model and the broker bias 
model, the primary preference of the brokers is to preserve their credibility. The 
conditional preference of the brokers depends both on broker bias as well as broker 
competition. The individual investor, if it pays attention to brokers’ signals, is 
additionally assumed to be conservative meaning that if the signals conflict than the 
lesser signal will be followed by the individual investor. As an example, if B1 signals I 
and B2 signals C then the individual investor, if it decides to pay attention to the signals, 
will act on C.  The following inequalities describe relevant cases of broker competition:
Severe Competition
In this type of competition, each broker prefers an outcome in which its prediction holds 
true whereas the prediction of the other broker is wrong; even if it means that, as a result 
of conflicting signals from the brokers, the investors will not invest. Conditional on 
maintaining credibility, the following inequality describes the relevant cases for B2:
},,max{},,,,min{ 222222222 , NNNCCCIIINCCNIICIICNNINNICC uuuuuuuuu > (10)
12
Here, ICCu 2 is the payoff to B2 if B1 signals I, B2 signals C, and the investors play C. That 
is, the prediction of B2 holds true whereas the prediction of B1 turns out to be false. Other 
payoffs of B2 are read similarly. This inequality shows that if the broker moving second 
can choose between two types of outcomes, type 1 being outcomes in which B2 is correct 
and B1 is incorrect, and type 2 being outcomes in which both are correct, then it will 
choose type 1 even if it means that the investors will not invest in the market. This shows 
that competition is so severe that the broker is willing to sacrifice all of the potential 
investment by investors to prove that the other broker is wrong.
The following inequality describes the relevant cases for B1:
},,max{},,,,min{ 111111111 , NNNCCCIIICNCINIICINCNNINCIC uuuuuuuuu > (11)
Here, CICu1 is the payoff to B1 if B1 signals C, B2 signals I and the investors play C. That is, 
the prediction of B1 holds true whereas the prediction of B2 turns out to be false. Other 
payoffs are read in the same fashion.
Moderate Competition
In this type of competition, each broker prefers an outcome in which its own prediction 
turns out to be correct whereas the prediction of the other broker turns out to be incorrect 
provided that the investors do not entirely abstain from the market as a result of signals 
from the brokers. That is, each broker wants at least some investment (at least C) from 
the investors to remain in the market. This is in contrast with severe competition in which 
each broker is willing to tolerate complete abstention of the investors for the sake of 
being right when the other broker is wrong.  
The following inequalities describe the relevant cases:
},max{},,,min{ 222222 CCCIIINIINCCCIIICC uuuuuu > (12)
},max{},min{ 22222 , NNNCNNINNCCCIII uuuuu > (13)
},max{},,,min{ 111111 CCCIIIINICNCICICIC uuuuuu > (14)
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},max{},min{ 11111 , NNNNCNNINCCCIII uuuuu > (15)
Broker Bias
The following inequalities describe the possible cases of broker bias conditional on 
maintaining credibility:
},,max{},,min{ 111111 CNCCCCCICINIICIIII uuuuuu > (16)
},,max{},,min{ 111111 NNNNCNNINCNCCCCCIC uuuuuu > (17)
},,max{},,min{ 222222 NCCCCCICCNIICIIIII uuuuuu > (18)
},,max{},,min{ 222222 NNNCNNINNNCCCCCICC uuuuuu > (19)
Here, ICIu1 is the payoff to B1 if B1 signals I, B2 signals C, and investors plays I. Similarly, 
CIIu 2 is the payoff to B2 if B1 signals C, B1 signals I and investors play I. These inequalities 
show that conditional on maintaining its credibility, each broker prefers an outcome in 
which more investment comes into the market.
The broker bias inequalities },max{ 222 NCCICCIII uuu > , },max{ 222 CNNINNCCC uuu > , 
},max{ 111 CNCCICIII uuu > , and },max{ 111 NCNNINCCC uuu > directly contradict the severe 
competition inequalities IIINCCICC uuu 222 },min{ > , CCCCNNINN uuu 222 },min{ > , 
IIICNCCIC uuu 111 },min{ > , and CCCNCNNIN uuu 111 },min{ > . Also, the broker bias inequalities 
},max{ 222 NCCICCIII uuu > and },max{ 111 CNCCICIII uuu > directly contradict the moderate 
competition inequalities IIINCCICC uuu 222 },min{ > and IIICNCCIC uuu 111 },min{ > . So, there are 
four possible cases; competition is severe and it dominates bias, competition is moderate 
and it dominates bias, bias dominates severe competition, and bias dominates moderate 
competition. The following theorem describes the main result of this section:
Theorem 2 If the investors are conservative, competition is moderate, and it  
dominates broker bias then there is a unique Pure-Strategy Perfect Bayesian 
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equilibrium, in which, in the absence of superior information, investors’ favorite outcome 
is realized.
Proof Start by proposing the following strategy for S:
}|,|,|,|,|,|,|,|,|{ CCCCNNNCNINNNINCICICCNNNIII
In this strategy, if both B1 and B2 send the same signal, I, N, or C, S plays I, N, or C 
respectively. However, if the signals are in conflict, lesser investment signal is followed 
(S is conservative).  That is, if B1 signals I but B2 signals C then S plays C (third entry in 
the above set).  
If L is optimistic then it always play I, if pessimistic then it always plays N. However, if 
L is neutral than it prefers to mimic S. Propose the following strategy for neutral L:
}|,|,|,|,|,|,|,|,|{ CCCCNNNCNINNNINCICICCNNNIII .
In order to figure out the best response of B1, consider the following: 
B1 has 27 possible strategies. Its primary preference of credibility eliminates 24 of them 
leaving only 3 strategies that are not dominated. These three strategies are:
}|,|,|{ cpessimistiNneutralIoptimisticI
}|,|,|{ cpessimistiNneutralCoptimisticI
}|,|,|{ cpessimistiNneutralNoptimisticI
If nature picks L’s type to be neutral, B1 cannot report I since B2 will then report C since 
in moderate competition IIIICC uu 22 > . Consequently, S and L will play C and B1 will lose 
its credibility. Similarly, if L’s type is neutral, B1 cannot report N since B2 will then report 
N also, resulting in both investors abstaining from the market.  In moderate competition, 
B1 and B2 prefer that at least some investment (at least C) from L remains in the market. 
That guarantees that if B1 signals C then B2 will also signal C.  That leaves only one 
possible strategy for B1 that can be played in pure strategy equilibrium:
}|,|,|{ cpessimistiNneutralCoptimisticI
Given the strategies of the other three players, the best response of B2 is to signal C if L’s 
type is neutral and B1 has signaled C or I since in moderate competition CNNCCC uu 22 > and
IIIICC uu 22 > . The best response strategy of B2 is:
}|,|,|,|;|{ NneutralNIneutralCCneutralCNcpessimistiNIoptimisticI
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It is straightforward to see that the proposed strategies for S and L are the best responses 
of S and L to each other as well as to B1 and B2. Hence, the strategy profile considered 
constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
To see that this equilibrium is unique: Since brokers’ primary preference is credibility, 
they will always report truthfully if nature chooses L’s type to be either optimistic or 
pessimistic. That means, any strategy in which S ignores broker signals cannot be played 
in pure-strategy equilibrium simply because it cannot be the best response when nature 
picks L’s type to be either optimistic or pessimistic. This observation combined with the 
conservative nature of investors’ limits their strategy space to a singleton.
▄
In this equilibrium, in the absence of superior information (when L is neutral), both the 
brokers signal C and the favorite outcome of the investors is realized (S and L both play 
C).
 
Corollary 1 If bias dominates competition then, in the absence of superior  
information, the brokers get their favorite outcome.
 
Proof If L’s type is neutral, B1 will signal I and B2 will follow suit since when bias 
dominates, INNICCIII uuu 222 >> and NNNCCCIII uuu 111 >> .▄
Corollary 2 If competition is severe and it dominates bias then, in the absence of  
superior information, both investors will abstain from investing in the market.
Proof If L’s type is neutral, it follows directly from severe competition inequalities that 
B1 will signal N and B2 will also signal N since if either broker signals anything else, it 
will lose its credibility. Both the investors will play N. ▄
The results indicate that competition has a mitigating effect on intermediary 
manipulation. If competition is moderate then the most favored outcome of investors in 
the absence of superior information, which is to invest with caution, is realized. That is, 
the brokers cannot manipulate the outcome to their advantage in that case. If the 
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competition is severe, then the investors abstain from the market in the absence of 
superior information. If bias dominates competition then the brokers get their favorite 
outcome in the absence of superior information. It is easy to extend theorems 1 and 2 to 
the case when broker(s) imperfectly observe L’s type. Similarly, instead of brokers 
moving in a sequence, brokers may be allowed to move simultaneously without changing 
the results.
Do emerging markets differ significantly from mature markets along the 
dimension of competition? Indeed, they do. Many emerging markets are still not 
demutualized. As one example, the Karachi Stock Exchange, the premier stock exchange 
in Pakistan is still a mutually owned company. This mutual ownership by brokers 
severely limits competition apart from raising governance concerns. No wonder, broker 
manipulation stories abound in emerging markets and not much so in developed markets.
The above are simple microstructure models of stock price manipulation in which 
manipulators are in the role of intermediaries. Main findings are that an intermediary can 
manipulate outcomes in equilibrium without losing credibility. However, enough 
competition has a mitigating effect on manipulation and the investors’ favorite outcome 
is realized. Nevertheless, if broker competition exceeds a certain threshold then, in the 
absence of superior information, it results in investors abstaining from the market 
entirely. The results indicate that encouraging broker competition may be a solution to 
the intermediary manipulation problem in emerging markets since competition checks 
broker bias. In this respect, demutualization of stock exchanges is a step in the right 
direction.
The results are important for three reasons. Firstly, it is an initial attempt at 
making sense of broker manipulation through rational economic models. Manipulation 
anecdotes abound, however, a model that predicts manipulation by brokers where all 
players are rational is lacking. Secondly, the role of competition in mitigating this type of 
manipulation has been highlighted. Competition among brokers reduces manipulation in 
these models. Thirdly, brokers make money when people invest in the market. This built 
in bias neutralizes competition by providing a powerful incentive for collusion, a finding 
with important governance implications. 
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Conclusion
Stock price manipulation by brokers is an issue that frequently raises its head, specially in 
less developed or emerging markets. However, the lack of an appropriate theoretical 
framework had left a number of questions unanswered thus far. In particular, Can brokers 
manipulate if all market participants are rational? Or, how can brokers not lose credibility 
if they indeed are engaged in manipulation? Presumably, loss of reputation or credibility 
would hamper their ability to continue manipulating. Also, what are the reasons behind 
fewer manipulation anecdotes emerging from the developed markets? 
In this paper, we presented a simple market microstructure framework that 
provides an answer to these questions. Interestingly, we find that it is the brokers’ 
concern for credibility that allows them to manipulate while maintaining credibility. 
Indeed, brokers can manipulate even when the investors are rational. We also find that 
broker level competition reduces manipulation. This last finding has important 
implications for corporate governance. Many of the emerging world markets are still not 
demutualized, that is, the exchanges are mutually owned by brokers, something that 
hampers broker level competition by effectively banning entry of new-comers. Our 
results suggest that demutualization of stock exchanges is a step in the right direction. 
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